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ABSTRACT 
 
The existing monocentric city models mostly assume that residents are completely rational when 
making residential location and mode choice, and their direct utilities only depend on the consumption 
of two normal goods, a housing service and a composite non-housing good. This paper develops a new 
model by explicitly integrating the preference for solo-driving LQWRFDURZQHUV¶GLUHFWXWLOLW\IXQFWLRQV
It is found that, an upward sloping rent-distance relationship exists nearby the Central Business 
District (CBD) when all residents are car owners, which is significantly different from the conclusion 
reported in literature &RQVLGHULQJ WKH LPSDFW RI FDU RZQHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFH for solo-driving, we 
differentiate two possible urban spatial patterns in a monocentric city with car-owning and no-car-
owning residents. Numerical results show that an increase of car ownership does not always lead to an 
expansion in the city size. 
 
Keywords: monocentric city model, urban spatial equilibrium, household residential choice, mode 
choice, car ownership 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most of countries in the world have experienced substantial increases in private car ownership over 
the recent decades. Taking China for example, according to a report stated by the Ministry of Public 
Security, China, 23.85 million new cars were registered in China, taking car ownership up to 172 
million in 2015 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/25/c_135043964.htm). For every 100 
households there are 31 private cars, the statement said, adding that in big cities such as Beijing and 
Shenzhen, the number may be up to 60. This rapid development on car ownership raises an important 
question: how does the urban spatial structure changes accordingly? The answer to this question may 
have significant implication in the sustainable urban development.  
 
Classical monocentric city models adopt such assumptions that all residents in a monocentric city are 
homogeneous in all aspects and there is only one transport mode, i.e., car, to provide commuting 
service (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1972). They found a downward sloping rent-distance 
relationship to achieve locational equilibrium due to the trade-off between accessibility and space. In 
reality, various transport modes, e.g., private car, bus and subway, compete with each other for serving 
residents who live in different places in a city. To our knowledge, some researchers investigated the 
joint choices of travel mode and residential location in a city model with user homogeneity or by 
dividing residents into different income groups (e.g., LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Sasaki, 1989, 1990; 
Brueckner, 2005; Borck, and Wrede, 2008; Su and DeSalvo, 2008; Creutzig, 2014; Buyukeren and 
Hiramatsu, 2015; Xu et al., 2016). In these models, all residents are assumed to be completely rational 
and have similar consuming decisions, i.e., their direct utilities only depend on the consumption of two 
normal goods, a housing service and a composite non-housing good. However, car owners can behave 
completely differently from non-car owners in reality. Non-car owners have no options but to 
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commute by public transport. In contrast, car owners can choose to commute by either car or public 
transport (PT), but they usually have a higher preference for solo-driving. It can be predicted that 
integrating the preference for solo-driving LQWR FDU RZQHUV¶ GLUHFW XWLOLW\ IXQFWLRQV has important 
impacts on car owners¶ residential location choices and housing bid rents. Furthermore, The bi-rent 
competition between car-owners and non-car owners in the housing (land) market to a large extent 
determines the spatial structure of a city.  
 
Considering a continuous space monocentric city where all jobs are located in the Central Business 
District (CBD), we develop an urban spatial equilibrium model for the integrated analysis of car-
owning and no-car-owning UHVLGHQWV¶residential location and mode choice. This model contributes to 
the literature by explicitly integrating the preference for solo-driving into FDU RZQHUV¶ GLUHFW XWLOLW\
functions. Based on the developed model, we firstly analyze the case that all residents are car owners 
and find that incorporating the preference for solo-driving make an upward sloping rent-distance 
relationship nearby the CBD possible. Secondly, we differentiate two possible urban spatial patterns 
under car-owners and non-car owners¶MRLQWFKRLFHGHFLVLRQVRIUHVLGHQWLDOORFDWLRQDQGWUDYHOPRGH
and numerically examine the impact of car ownership on the urban spatial structure. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
In this section, we introduce two important components of the developed monocentric city model with 
car ownership heterogeneity, i.e., car owners and non-car owners¶ choice decisions, respectively. Non-
car owners are assumed to only commute by public transport to the CBD and make residential location 
decisions on the consumption of two normal goods, a housing service and a composite non-housing 
good. In contrast, car owners are assumed to choose to commute by car or by public transport using a 
logit form. Furthermore, besides the consumption of two normal goods, car owners¶ direct utilities at 
location x  (its distance to the CBD is x ) are also related to the preference for solo-driving, i.e., the 
probability of choosing car mode at location x , which is computed according to the relative difference 
between the actual daily commute costs of using the two modes. 
 
2.1 Car owner¶s choice decisions 
 
2.1.1 Logit-based mode choice 
 
Suppose that there are two modes of transportation providing commuting service from the city 
boundary to the CBD, car or public transport mode. The actual daily commute cost of using the two 
modes at location x  are both congestion-free and increase with commute distance x , given as 
 
( ) 2( )i i iC x f t x  , (1) 
where 1, 2i   represent the car and public transport modes, respectively; if  is the one-way fixed cost 
of using mode i , which includes all one-way travel costs independent of commute distance; it  is the 
marginal (mainly time) cost of commute per unit distance, so it x  is the one-way variable cost of using 
mode i , which includes all costs that vary with the commute distance. Compared with solo drivers, PT 
users generally have the smaller fixed cost and the larger marginal variable cost for completing a trip. 
Hence, we assume 1 2f f!  and 1 2t t  hold here for simplicity.  
 
Car owners are assumed to make mode-choice decisions in terms of the perceived daily commute 
costs of using the two modes, which is characterized as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )i i iPC x C x xH  , (2) 
where ( )iC x  is defined in Eq. (1); ( )i xH  is the random error term. Suppose that all random terms 
( )i xH  are identically and independently distributed (IID) Gumbel variables with mean zero and 
3 
 
 
 
variance V , then the probability of choosing car mode at location x  can be governed by the following 
logit formulation: 
    11 2( ) 1 exp ( ( ) ( ))P x C x C xT    , (3) 
where 6T S V . Differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to x  produces 
      21 2 2 1
1,2
( ) 2 exp ( ( ) ( )) exp ( ) 0j
j
dP x C x C x t t C x
dx
T T T

 
§ ·    !¨ ¸© ¹¦ . (4) 
Since 1 2t t  according to the assumption, Eq. (4) shows that the probability of choosing car mode 
increases with the commute distance. 
 
Accordingly, the expected daily commute cost for car owners located at x  is (Oppenheim, 1995) 
  
1,2
1( ) ln exp ( )c j
j
C x C xTT  
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹¦ . (5) 
Differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to x , getting 
 
   
 1 1 2 2
1,2
2exp ( ) 2exp ( )( ) 0
exp ( )
c
j
j
C x t C x tdC x
dx C x
T T
T
 
   !¦ . (6) 
Eq. (6) implies that the expected daily commute cost for car owners increases with the commute 
distance. 
 
2.1.2 Household consumption and residential location choice 
 
For a car owner at location x , her optimal decision is to resolve the following direct utility 
maximization problem under her budget constraint: 
  
1 1
1 1 1 1( ), ( ), ( )
( ) max ( ), ( ), ( )
z x q x P x
U x V z x q x P x , (7) 
subject to the budget constraint 
 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cz x R x q x Y C x FM    . (8) 
Here,  1 1 1( ), ( ), ( )V z x q x P x  is car owners¶ direct utility function, where 1( )z x  is the location-
dependent consumption of a composite non-housing good, 1( )q x  is the location-dependent 
consumption of housing (also called the lot size), and ( )P x  is the location-dependent probability of 
choosing car mode as defined before, representing the preference for solo-driving; 1( )U x  is car 
owners¶ location-dependent indirect utility function; 1( )R x  is the location-dependent housing rental 
price per unit and the price of non-housing good is taken to be unity for simplicity; ( )cC x  is the 
expected daily commute cost defined in Eq. (5); M  and cY , respectively, are the frequency of 
commuting and the wage revenue of car owners in a consumption period; and F
 
is the fixed cost of 
purchasing a car allocated to each consumption period. For convenience of further analysis, the 
following Cobb±Douglas form of direct utility function is adopted in this paper: 
        1 1 1 1 1( ), ( ), ( )   0,  1V z x q x P x z x q x P xD E D E D E !   , , . (9) 
By solving the budget constraint in  1z x  and substituting it into Eq. (9), the first order condition of 
Eq. (9) with respect to  1q x  gives a unique demand for the lot size, which is implicitly defined as 
 1
1 1
( ) 0V VR x
z q
w w   w w . (10) 
Then we obtain 
4 
 
 
 
1
1
( )( )= ( )
c cY C x Fq x
R x
E M 
, > @1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cU x Y C x F R x q x q x P xD EM    . (11) 
All car owners are assumed to be homogenous, thus the urban spatial equilibrium must yield an 
identical utility level for all car owners, denoted as 1u . So, we have 1 1( )U x u  for all x . Combining 
this with Eq. (11), we derive the 1( )R   and 1( )q  , which are functions of utility level 1u , as follows: 
     1 111 1 1, ( ) ( )c cR x u Y C x F u P x
D
E E EED E M    , (12) 
     1 11 1 1, ( ) ( )c cq x u Y C x F u P x
D DE E EED M    . (13) 
It can easily observed from Eqs. (12) and (13) that, the housing rental price  1 1,R x u  will decrease 
with the expected daily commuting cost and increase with the probability of choosing car mode if 
utility level 1u  is fixed. But, the lot size  1 1,q x u  has the opposite property. 
Differentiating Eq. (12) with respect to x , getting 
    11 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )cc c c cdCdR dPu Y C x F P x P x Y C x Fdx dx dx
D DDE E EED E M M M § ·      ¨ ¸© ¹ . (14) 
Then, we have 
 
1 0dR
dx
!
  if  ( ) ( ) cc c dCdPY C x F P xdx dxM M
!
   . (15) 
Hence, for the occurrence of an upward sloping rent-distance relationship, the change of the 
probability of choosing car mode must dominate the change of the expected daily commuting cost as 
the commute distance increases. If the latter dominates, the housing rental price will decrease with the 
commute distance. 
 
2.2 Non-car owner¶s choice decisions 
 
For a non-car owner, she chooses the consumption of a composite non-housing good and a housing 
service to maximizing his/her utility under her budget constraint. The utility maximization problem for 
non-car owners can be written as (Li et al., 2013; Gubins and Verhoef, 2014; Xu et al., 2016) 
  
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2( ), ( )
( ) max ( ), ( ) ( ) ( )   0,  1
z x q x
U x V z x q x z x q xD E D E D E  !   , , , (16) 
subject to the budget constraint 
 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nc ncz x R x q x Y C xM   . (17) 
Here,  2 2 2( ), ( )V z x q x  is non-car owners¶ direct utility function, where 2 ( )z x  is the location-
dependent consumption of a composite non-housing good and 2 ( )q x  is the location-dependent 
consumption of housing; 2 ( )U x  is non-car owners¶ location-dependent indirect utility function; 
2( )R x  is the location-dependent housing rental price per unit and the price of non-housing good is 
taken to be unity for simplicity; ( )ncC x  is non-FDURZQHUV¶ daily commute cost by PT; and ncY is the 
wage revenue of car owners in a consumption period. 
 
All non-car owners are assumed to be homogenous, thus the urban spatial equilibrium must yield an 
identical utility level for all non-car owners, denoted as 2u . So, we have 2 2( )U x u  for all x . At 
equilibrium, we derive the 2 ( )R   and 2 ( )q  , which are functions of utility level 2u , as follows: 
     112 2 2, ( )nc ncR x u Y C x u
D
E EED E M   , (18) 
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 12 2 2, ( )nc ncq x u Y C x u
D DE EED M   . (19) 
Obviously, under a given level of utility, the housing rental price decreases and the lot size per 
household increases with the distance from the CBD. 
 
3. POSSIBLE URBAN SPATIAL PATTERNS 
 
On the basis of all residents¶ choice decisions, the equilibrium land rent curve coincides with the upper 
envelope of the bid-rent curves associated with car owners and non-car owners. Thus, the equilibrium 
rent  1 2, ,R x u u  can be expressed as 
      ^ `1 2 1 1 2 2, , max , , ,R x u u R x u R x u . (20) 
At equilibrium, there might be various urban spatial patterns with respect to the city system parameters. 
Hereafter, we only consider two possible patterns, where at least part of non-car owners live near the 
CBD. 
 
Case (I). All non-car owners live near the CBD, while all car owners live farther. The urban structure 
of this pattern is depicted in Fig.1(I). The spatial equilibrium conditions are given as 
    1 0 1 2 0 2, ,R x u R x u ,  1 1, aR B u R , (21) 
 
0
2 20
1 ( , )dx ncq x u x N ³ , 
0
1 11 ( , )d
B
c
x
q x u x N ³ , (22) 
where B  is the endogenous city boundary, aR  is the exogenously fixed agricultural rent, 0x  is the 
residential separation point between car owners and non-car owners in the city, and cN  and ncN  are 
the number of car owners and non-car owners, respectively. Eq. (21) states that the bid-rents of the two 
groups are identical at the residential separation point, and the bid-rent of car owners who live in the 
city boundary is equal to the agricultural rent. Eq. (22) is the population conservation condition, which 
shows all non-car owners living between the CBD and location 0x  and all car owners reside between 
location 0x  and the city boundary. 
 
Case (II). Part of non-car owners live near the CBD and some non-car owners live close to the city 
boundary, while all car owners live in the middle region. This urban spatial structure is depicted in 
Fig.1 (II). The spatial equilibrium conditions are given as 
    1 1 1 2 1 2, ,R x u R x u ,    1 2 1 2 2 2, ,R x u R x u ,  2 2, aR B u R , (23) 
 
1
2
2 2 2 20
1 ( , )d 1 ( , )dx B nc
x
q x u x q x u x N  ³ ³ , 2
1
1 11 ( , )d
x
c
x
q x u x N ³ , (24) 
where 1x  and 2x  are the residential separation points between car owners and non-car owners in the 
city. Eq. (23) states the Land-market equilibrium condition and Eq. (24) is the population conservation 
condition. 
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Fig 1. Urban spatial structures 
 
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
 
To facilitate the presentation of the essential idea and contributions of this paper, in this section we 
employ some numerical examples to illustrate the application of the proposed model. The first 
scenario aims to show the effect of the driving preference on the urban spatial structure when all 
residents are car owners. The second scenario is used to explore the effect of the bid-rent competition 
between car owners and non-car owners on the urban spatial structure. The values of parameters 
associated with the two groups are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the values of parameters 
 Car owners Non-car owners 
Number of population 8000 / 8500cN   22000 / 21500ncN   
Annual income (RMB) 48 10cY  u  46 10ncY  u  
Parameters in utility function 0.75D   and 0.25E   
Agricultural rent (RMB/km2) 
53.0 10aR  u  (Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 case I) 
33.0 10aR  u  (Section 4.2 case II) 
Daily commuting cost (RMB) 
By car:    1 2 10 24 90C x x u      2 6 18 70ncC x x u   By PT:    2 2 6 24 70C x x u   
Fixed cost of purchasing a car (RMB) 25000F    
Parameter in Logit formulation 0.05T    
Frequency of commuting 300M    
 
4.1 The case that all residents are car owners 
 
Firstly, we look at the case that all residents are car owners to explore the effect of driving preference. 
Fig. 2 (a) and (b), respectively, show equilibrium patterns of rents and housing land consumption over 
the distance from the CBD. It is found that the land rent first increases and then decreases with 
distance from the CBD, which is different from the downward sloping rent function obtained in most 
of the existing monocentric city models. Furthermore, the consumption of housing land first decreases 
and then increases over space. In our setting, car owners¶ preference for solo-driving makes an upward 
sloping rent-distance relationship nearby the CBD possible.  
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Fig 2. Rents and consumption of land by residential location 
 
4.2 The cases with car-owning and no-car-owning residents 
 
Next, we present two specific cases of a city system with car-owning and no-car-owning residents for 
further insights, which correspond to different urban spatial patterns analyzed in Section 3, 
respectively. 
 
(1) Case I 
Fig. 3 shows the spatial patterns of rents and land consumption after the car ownership increases (with 
thicker line), in the case where all non-car owners live near the CBD, while all car owners live farther. 
The most striking result is that an increase of the car ownership generates an increased demand for 
housing land, i.e., the city boundary moves from 295.84 km to 296.11 km. It is also found that the 
residential separation point between the population decreases and the residential area for car owners 
expands. However, due to the competition between car owners, their bid rents increase, the 
consumption of housing land decreases, and the utility level of car owners reduces from 378.42 to 
377.09. For non-car owners, the decrease of land rent and the increase of housing land consumption 
lead to the improvement of utility level from 705.36 to 706.72. 
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Fig 3. Increase of the car ownership in Case (I) 
 
(2) Case II 
In this case, the agricultural land rent is 33.0 10aR  u  RMB/km2. Due to the low land rent near the city 
boundary, some non-car owners will choose to reside in this area. Fig. 4 displays the change of the 
housing land rent and consumption with the increase of the car ownership. It can be observed that the 
city boundary decreases from 306.04 km to 305.92 km, which is different from the results in Case I. 
Furthermore, the utility level of non-car owners increases from 707.10 to 708.44, while the utility 
level of car owners decreases from 376.43 to 375.26. 
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Fig 4. Increase of car ownership in Case (II) 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER STUDIES 
 
This paper investigated the effects of car owners¶ preference for solo-driving and car ownership 
changes on the urban spatial structure. For car owners, they can choose to commute by either car or 
public transport using a logit form, and the probability of choosing car mode influences their direct 
utility levels. The developed monocentric city model with car-owning and no-car-owning residents 
provides some important findings and new insights for urban economics and transportation research. 
Firstly, when all residents are car owners, an upward sloping rent-distance relationship becomes 
possible. Second, as far as the two possible urban spatial patterns explored are concerned, the increase 
of car ownership not always lead to the urban expansion. It may produce a contraction in the city size 
if some non-car owners live close to the city boundary. 
 
Although the findings and insights might be valuable, there are some limitations of the study on the in-
depth interactions between transportation systems and urban systems. Both the car and public transit 
modes are assumed to be congestion-free for simplicity. This assumption is widely adopted in the 
urban economics literature, but it is to a large extent unrealistic in most of cities around the world. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to endogenize residents¶ daily commuting costs by taking traffic 
congestion or crowding effects into account. Furthermore, a monocentric urban structure is assumed in 
this paper. It is meaningful to extend to investigate a ploycentric urban structure. 
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